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Sentence Review by the Trial Court:
A Proposal to Amend Rule 35
JUDGE CHARLES B. RENFREW*
During the four years I have been on the bench, I have encountered
no task more challenging, no decision more excruciating, no responsi-
bility more awesome than that of imposing sentence on the criminal
defendants who appear before me. It is a responsibility which I have
had to assume hundreds of times, virtually alone in an uncharted sea,
and acutely aware that my decisions would have the most profound
and far-reaching effects upon the lives of the defendants in my court.
However substantial the stakes or however complex the legal issues in
a civil lawsuit-and I have indeed been fortunate to have presided over
civil cases involving extraordinarily exciting and important matters,
argued by some of the ablest attorneys in the country-they are vastly
overshadowed by the gravity of the fundamental question I face as a
sentencing judge: whether, in what way, and how severely should I
punish a fellow human being.
The word "sentence" derives from the Latin verb sentire, to feel.
The derivation is apt, for in fashioning a criminal sentence the judge,
more than in any other judicial task, must draw upon his own values,
insight, and intuition, respond to the parameters of the situation and
the character of the individual before him, and strive to achieve what
he can only sense will be a just and fair disposition. It is troubling that
decisions as grave as these are being made every day by judges who,
like myself, were almost totally unencumbered, prior to going on the
bench, by learning or experience relevant to sentencing.' Opportunities
* United States District Court, Northern District of California.
I wish to express my gratitude to my law clerk, Paul Sugarman, for assisting in the
preparation of this article.
1Judge Marvin E. Frankel has lamented the near total unpreparedness of most trial
judges for fashioning criminal sentences:
Nothing they studied in law school touched our subject more than remotely.
Probably a large majority had no contact, or trivial contact, with criminal pro-
ceedings of any kind during their years of practice. Those who had such exposure
worked preponderantly on the prosecution side. Whether or not this produces a
troublesome bias, the best that can be said is that prosecutors tend generally either
to refrain altogether from taking positions on sentencing or to deal with the sub-
ject at a bargaining level somewhat removed from the plane of penological ideals.
Thus qualified, the new judge may be discovered within days or weeks
fashioning judgments of imprisonment for long years. No training, formal or
informal, precedes the first of these awesome pronouncements. Such formal and
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for self-education exist, and most judges conscientiously attempt to in-
form themselves of the range of sentencing alternatives and of the under-
lying principles, objectives, and ideals of the corrections process.2 But
at heart, sentencing decisions are more inductive than deductive, more
a product of creative inference than of scientific proof, and far more
impressionistic than we like to admit.
None of these observations is novel. Indeed, such observations
merely echo the rallying cry of those who seek to reform the criminal
sentencing process: that the power of punishment must not rest in a
single judge, free to exercise within limits so broad as to be nearly
meaningless a discretion virtually unchecked and unreviewable. Fre-
quently this criticism focuses upon the identity of the punisher, his
background, philosophy and idiosyncracies,3 and the particular skills or
lack thereof he brings to the task.4 More often though, the emphasis
intentional education, other than from the job itself, as may happen along the
way is likely to be fleeting, random, anecdotal, and essentially trivial.
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CiN. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1972).
Of equal concern is the fact that even after imposing hundreds of sentences, the trial
judge has precious little empirical data upon which to draw as to the effect and ultimate
consequences of any sentence. It is for this reason that I urge that the sentencing judge
obtain as much data as possible about each individual he must sentence. Even with this
data, though, we can only hope that the judge will exercise a sensitive awareness to the
often conflicting interests involved in sentencing: protecting society without at the same
time destroying an individual.
2Any effort at self-enlightenment is complicated by the fact that rarely has there
been general agreement, either at any one time or across time, on what those principles,
objectives, and ideals should be.
In 1864 Sir Henry Maine could already say "All theories on the subject of
punishment have more or less broken down . . . and we are again at sea as to
first principles." Some forty years later Professor Kenny, after examining current
opinions of judges and legislators alike, reached the same conclusion: ideas on
punishment had failed to assume "either a coherent or a stable form." Twenty
years later, discussing the position in the United States, Dean Roscoe Pound spoke
of the "fundamental conflict with respect to aims and purposes" pervading both
penal legislation and penal administration. And now, after another lapse of
twenty years, Professor Jerome Hall has shown that the divergence of views is
as wide as it was a century ago.
L. RADZINOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CirAfE 114 (1966).
Even within the last few years we have witnessed in my own state of California and
in the Federal Bureau of Prisons a dramatic shift of emphasis from rehabilitation to
punishment as the principal goal of the corrections process, a shift that has been endorsed
by some leading commentators in the field of penology. See, e.g., Morris, The Future of
Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philosophy, 72 MIcHr. L. REV. 1161 (1974).
3 "Where law and precedent provide weak guidelines rather than mandates, the chief
factors associated with the judge's choice may be discovered in his personal history and
in his political and social environment." Cook, Sentencing Behavior of Federal Judges:
Draft Cases-1972, 42 U. CiN. L. REv. 597 (1973).
4 Many have argued that judges are particularly ill-suited to sentencing criminal de-
fendants. Justice Frankfurter, for example, expressed his views as follows:
I myself think that the bench-we lawyers who become judges-are not very
competent, are not qualified by experience, to impose sentences where any dis-
cretion is to be exercised. I do not think it is in the domain of the training of
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is upon the abundant-many would say excessive--discretion the trial
judge is permitted to exercise in fashioning criminal sentences.
The common form of criminal penalty provision confers upon the
sentencing judge an enormous range of choice. The scope of what
we call "discretion" permits imprisonment for anything from a day to
one, five, 10, 20, or more years. All would presumably join in de-
nouncing a statute that said "the judge may impose any sentence he
pleases." Given the mortality of men, the power to set a man free
or confine him for up to 30 years is not sharply distinguishable. 5
Not surprisingly, most recent criticism of the sentencing process
has focused upon ways in which the discretionary power of the sen-
tencing judge can be structured, limited, reviewed, or, as some have
advocated, eliminated. Writings in this area abound,' and it is not my
purpose to add to that vast literature by setting forth here my own
suggestions for dramatic overhaul of sentencing procedures in the fed-
eral courts. My objective is far more limited; I wish only to describe
and recommend adoption of a practice which I follow in my own court
every time I impose sentence on a criminal defendant. It is a practice
which looks not to the elimination of the sentencing judge's discretion,
but, I believe, to enhanced exploitation of the advantages that can be
derived from its existence.
lawyers to know what to do with a fellow once you find out he is a thief .... I
think the lawyers are people who are competent to ascertain whether or not a crime
has been committed.... But all the questions that follow upon ascertainment of
guilt, I think require very different and much more diversified talent than lawyers
are likely to possess.
Statement of Felix Frankfurter, quoted in Pilot Institute on Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231,
316 (1959). Others have urged that the supervision and administration of the entire cor-
rections process, including sentencing, be assigned to medical and sociological experts. See,
e.g., H. BARNEs, T= STORY OF Puusar-N-A REcoRD OF MAN'S INHUMANITY To MA
266 (1930). Although I believe that discretion in sentencing should continue to exist, it is
not my purpose here to argue in whom it should lie. However, it is my opinion that our
experience with an indeterminate sentence structure, where sentencing decisions do rest
in the hands of nonjudicial officers, has clearly shown that such officers have generally not
exercised well the vast discretion entrusted to them. See Note, The Collective Sentencing
Decision in Judicial and Administrative Contexts: A Comparative Analysis of Two Ap-
proaches to Correctional Disparity, 11 AM. CRim. L. Rxv. 695, 708-13 (1973).
Indeed, the Attorney General of California, the chief law officer of the state which
pioneered the indeterminate sentence thirty years ago, has recently declared the system a
proven failure-a conclusion I share-and recommended its dismantlement.
5 Frankel, supra note 1, at 4. The existence of such wide-ranging discretion is usually
justified by reference to an assumption underlying current sentencing theories, namely, that
every sentence must be individualized, tailored to the particular offender and his offense
in a way that will prevent him and others from committing future crimes. Comment, Dis-
cretion in Felony Sentencing-a Study of Influencing Factors, 48 WASH. L. REv. 857,
859 (1973).
GFor an excellent bibliography on sentencing and corrections, see 11 Am. Cim. L.
REv. 217 (1972).
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Since going on the bench I have evolved the practice of reviewing
automatically and on my own motion all criminal judgments 100 days
after they have been entered and modifying those sentences I feel should
be altered in some way. I am authorized to conduct this review by
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.7 I strongly be-
lieve that there is much to gain from automatic review by the sentencing
judge of all correctional dispositions and, when appropriate, modifica-
tion of some. Moreover, I believe that the benefit that flows from re-
view of criminal judgments can be further increased by amendment of
Rule 35, as detailed below.'
The motion to reduce sentence under Rule 35,9 whether made by
the defendant or by the court sua sponte, is premised on the assumption
that a certain amount of time has passed since the court first imposed
sentence and that reconsideration of the sentence is perhaps advisable.
It is frequently said that such a motion "is essentially a plea for leniency
and presupposes a valid conviction."' 0 The Rule gives every criminal
defendant an opportunity for a second round before the sentencing judge
and permits the court to decide if, on further reflection, the original
sentence now appears unduly harsh." It is clearly premised on the
psychological principle that passage of time may find the sentencing
judge in a more sympathetic or receptive frame of mind,'2 and thus
allows the judge to correct any sentence which may have been imposed
in response to particular pressures or to a particular mood or temper
present on the day of sentencing. It is widely recognized that a mo-
tion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court,'" and is reviewable on appeal only for
abuse of that discretion. 4
7 Rule 35 reads as follows:
The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of
sentence. The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is
imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon
affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days after
entry of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court denying review of, or having
the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction. The court may also reduce a
sentence upon revocation of probation as provided by law.
8See text accompanying notes 28-38 infra.
9 The discussion that follows is concerned only with a motion to reduce a sentence,
and not with one to correct an illegal sentence.
10 Poole v. United States, 250 F.2d 396, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"1 See, e.g., United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 918 (1968), rehearing denied, 399 U.S. 917 (1970); United States v. Maynard,
485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973).
12 8A J. MooRE, Mooas's FDERAL PRAcTicE 1f 35.02[l], at 35-4 (2d ed. 1975).
18 Green v. United States, 481 F.2d 1140, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v.
Krueger, 454 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Williams, 446 F.2d 486,
[Vol. 51:355
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Rule 35 also permits the district court to consider any additional
relevant information that may have come to light since sentence was
imposed. In its simplest manifestation, this means that an opportunity
exists to correct obvious error.
One of the purposes of Rule 35 in permitting reduction of a sentence
within 120 days of its imposition..., is to provide time for the de-
fendant to bring to the attention of the sentencing judge any mistake
that might have been made or any misapprehension under which the
judge may have been laboring when imposing sentence. 5
More importantly, however, in reviewing a sentence, the judge has
access to additional information not available at the time of sentencing,
in particular the manner in which a defendant has conducted himself
since sentence was imposed.'" Judges have traditionally been permitted
to consider all information relevant to determining the severity of the
sentence to be imposed, and much useful information is contained in
the pre-sentence report prepared by the Probation Department pursuant
to Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. I believe
that the more information and data the sentencing judge has, the more
likely he is to reach a fair and just sentence. Increased utilization of
the review procedures of Rule 35 would expand significantly the infor-
mation base upon which corrections decisions rest. My own procedure
for obtaining a report of the defendant's conduct during the 100-day
period following his sentencing is set forth below.
I have found that other benefits flow from my practice of review-
ing all criminal judgments. When I impose sentence, I advise the de-
fendant of my intention to review his sentence after 100 days. I also
488 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jones, 444 F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir. 1971); United States
v. Brown, 428 F.2d 1191, 1193 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 941 (1970).
14 On rare occasions a court of appeals will find such abuse of discretion and will itself
reduce the sentence. See, e.g., McGee v. United States, 462 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1972); United
States v. McKinney, 466 F.2d 1403, 1405 (6th Cir. 1972), discussed in 7 SuFFOLK U. L. Rv.
1128 (1973). More commonly, however, when an appellate court disagrees with the sen-
tence imposed, it will do no more than engage in some gentle arm-twisting:
We recognize, of course, that the imposition of sentence is in the sound discretion
of the District Judge. The sentence seems to us extremely harsh, but circumstances
not disclosed by the record may justify it. We think the District Court should
seriously consider exercising its power under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 to reduce the
sentences imposed.
Wilson v. United States, 335 F.2d 982, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
15 United States v. Erickson, 300 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
16 I recognize, of course, that a report describing the defendant's conduct in the con-
trolled environment of an institution may not be indicative of how he will perform at a
future date in society, and therefore should not be controlling in the decision whether
modification is desired. However, certain information from the institution, such as partici-
pation in vocational and educational training, drug abuse programs, psychological counsel-
ing and the like, may be of material significance. Such information, when carefully evaluated
and balanced, may substantially support modification of sentence.
1976]
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inform him that in the overwhelming majority of cases I do not modify
my sentence, but that the possibility exists, and therefore he should con-
duct himself in the best possible manner at the institution. It has been
my experience that this procedure frequently encourages a defendant to
get started on the right foot, and that the effort he makes and the pat-
tern he establishes are continued during the remainder of his incarcera-
tion. Finally, I have also found that for many defendants the knowl-
edge that somebody is interested in them and is indeed following their
progress can be very meaningful and supportive.
Although I strongly believe that the sentencing judge should re-
view all corrections judgments several months after they are entered,
my own experience suggests that actual modification of sentence will
occur infrequently, and for good reason. Balanced against the benefits
to be derived from the reduction of a sentence in a particular case is
the desirability of preserving the general expectation that a court's sen-
tencing decisions are permanent and subject to change only in unusual
circumstances. Though a court should never refuse to modify a sen-
tence solely on the grounds that permanency of decision is a worthwhile
goal,' 7 neither should it ignore that consideration. The reduction of a
sentence is, and should remain, an uncommon action taken in response
to an exceptional situation.
Sentencing is not a game nor is it a matter of contract with the de-
fendant who receives the sentence .... Though courts do their best
in the first instance to perform this task, occasionally a situation arises
where it appears that the sentence originally imposed is inadequate
to fulfill its multiple purpose [sic]. In such a situation, the Court
has a responsibility to adjust the sentence so that it will fulfill its
purpose.'
Were modification of sentences to become the rule rather than the ex-
ception, both the efficient administration of the criminal justice system
and the defendant himself would suffer as a result. In my own court,
I have modified the sentences of only 14 of the hundreds of defendants
I have sentenced. 10
A proper understanding of the intent and purpose of Rule 35
should further contribute to the infrequent exercise of the court's dis-
17 United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1968).
18United States v. Mandracchia, 247 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.N.H. 1965).
19 In analyzing those cases in which the original sentence was modified, I have dis-
covered no pattern either with respect to the nature of the offense or of the particular
defendant, with a single exception: modification occurred in several cases when an educa-
tional or employment opportunity became available which had to be seized at that
particular time and where I believed the maximum benefit from incarceration already had
been obtained. In those cases, where the circumstances warranted, I modified the sentence
and placed the defendant on a very conditional probation.
[Vol. 51:355
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cretionary authority to reduce a sentence. That authority is limited by
time constraints.20 By no means should the sentencing judge attempt
to exercise the equivalent of executive clemency.21
Both procedurally and administratively, a practice of reviewing
automatically all corrections judgments imposes only a slight addi-
tional burden on the sentencing judge and the penal authorities. It is
well established that the defendant is not entitled to a formal hearing
on a motion to reduce sentence ;22 nor is his presence required should
the court choose to hear testimony or arguments, or should it decide
to reduce the sentence.23 Therefore, penal authorities will not be in-
convenienced by routine transportation of every prisoner to court for
reconsideration of his sentence. From the judge's perspective the addi-
tional work entailed by a practice of reviewing all sentences centers
largely upon the effort needed to become informed of, and to evaluate
the defendant's progress since the imposition of sentence, as well as
any other relevant information that may have come to light. In my
own court, when a defendant is sentenced to an institution, I generally
write to the institution to which the defendant has been sent and tell
them that I will be reviewing my sentence within 100 days and would
appreciate their having the caseworker or some other official prepared to
discuss that particular defendant's case with me at the end of 90 or so
days. On the 100th day my secretary puts the file on my desk and my
courtroom deputy enters an appropriate minute order in the defendant's
file. 24 In those cases where the defendant has gone to an institution, I
call the institution and talk to the caseworker or some other official and
find out how the defendant has progressed. 25 I then evaluate the in-
formation I have received and decide either to modify the original sen-
tence imposed or, in the vast majority of cases, to let stand the original
20 See text accompanying notes 22-30 infra.
2 1United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
817 (1965).
2 2 United States v. Jones, 490 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989
(1974); Fournier v. United States, 485 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Krueger,
494 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1972).2 3 Fournier v. United States, 485 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1973).
24The minute order is in the following form: "It is hereby ordered that pursuant to
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the Court, on its own motion, Will
consider modification of the sentence imposed on the defendant herein."
25 Because I have visited for a period of three to four days each institution to which
I sentence defendants, I have some familiarity with the personnel and with the psychological,
educational, vocational, and other resources at each institution. The information I have
gleaned from these visits is of particular assistance to me in evaluating the reports I re-
ceive from the institution and deciding whether to modify a particular sentence.
19761
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sentence. My courtroom deputy then enters a minute order reflecting
the action taken.20
Often I feel that modification of the original sentence is not justi-
fied, but that the defendant has shown excellent progress at the insti-
tution. In those cases I write to the Board of Parole in support of the
defendant's early release. Despite the fact that the Board of Parole's
present policy is to adhere almost mechanically to its guidelines and to
take into account the progress of the defendant at the institution only
in a negative rather than a positive sense,27 I have found that such in-
terest on the part of the sentencing judge has on occasion resulted in
the release of the defendant on parole earlier than would otherwise
have occurred.
I believe that the procedure I have described would be even more
beneficial if Rule 35 were amended in two ways.2" The first change I
propose concerns the timing of sentence review. At present, Rule 35
provides that the court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after
the appeal is dismissed or the judgment affirmed. The 120-day require-
ment was added in 1966; prior to that time the Rule authorized the
court to act only within 60 days of the date of sentence. I propose that
the Rule be amended to permit consideration of a motion to reduce sen-
tence within 180 days of the imposition of sentence.
Operating within the 120-day limit has often proven troublesome
for many courts. Technically, the Rule is phrased so as to require the
court to act within 120 days, and not merely for the motion for reduc-
26 The order reads as follows:
The Court, having reviewed on its own motion pursuant to Rule 35 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the sentence imposed on the defendant herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sentence is modified as follows:
[or]
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sentence is not modified.
27 The guidelines presently utilized by the Board of Parole assume that the prisoner
has been on good behavior while at the Institution. If he has not, then the guidelines are
inapplicable and in all likelihood he will serve time beyond that specified in the guidelines.
The guidelines do not take into account how favorable an inmate's institutional behavior
has been. In sum, he gets no credit if he is good, but he is further penalized if he is bad.
28 The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States recently recommended to the Judicial Conference that Rule 35 be
amended in several particulars, the most significant of which would establish a Sentence
Review Panel, composed of three district judges of the circuit, to review upon the de-
fendant's motion all sentences which may result in imprisonment for two years or more.
The defendant must first seek reduction of his sentence from the trial judge. The Review
Panel would be empowered to modify, reduce, or confirm the sentence, but not to increase
it, and its decision would not be reviewable on appeal. The Judicial Conference discussed
the matter at length at its meeting on September 26, 1975, and decided not to approve
the proposed amendment and forward it to the Supreme Court at this time. The amend-
ments I propose here to Rule 35 are obviously of much more limited scope than those
recently considered by the Judicial Conference.
[Vol. 51:355
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tion of sentence to be filed within that period, a view seemingly en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court:
It is quite significant that Rule 45(b) not only prohibits the court
from enlarging the period for taking an appeal, but, by the same lan-
guage in the same sentence, also prohibits enlargement of the period
for taking any action under Rules 33, 34 and 35, except as provided
in those Rules .... [T]he Rules, in abolishing the limitation based
on the Court Term, did not substitute indefiniteness, but prescribed
precise times within which the power of the courts must be confined.
[I]t has been held that a District Court may not reduce a sentence
under Rule 35 after expiration of the 60-day [now 120-day] period
prescribed by that Rule regardless of excuse.29
Thus, the 120-day requirement is jurisdictional; unless it is met, "The
court has no jurisdiction or power to alter sentence."30
Almost all courts, however, have stretched the language of the
Rule to permit action after expiration of the 120-day period whenever
the motion was timely filed.31 Although some have disapproved of this
practice 2 it is one which is widely followed, acquiesced in by most
prosecutors, and, in my opinion, is consistent with the underlying pur-
pose of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 3 The court is still
obliged to act with reasonable promptness:
29 United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224-26 (1960).
3oUnited States v. United States District Court, Cent. Dist. of Cal., 509 F.2d 1352,
1354 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975). The Court of Appeals went on to
hold, however, that the sentencing court may nevertheless reduce a sentence within a
reasonable time after expiration of the 120-day period, provided the motion for reduction
of sentence was timely filed. See text accompanying note 34 infra.
31 The 120 day period is technically not the time within which the motion may
be made, but is rather the time within which the court may act. [Citation omitted.]
However, as a matter of practice, the requirement has been interpreted to permit a
court to act upon a motion as long as the motion is made within that period.
Irizzary v. United States, 58 F.R.D. 65, 67 (D. Mass. 1973).
32 Professor Moore, for example, suggests that with the increase in the time limitation
from 60 to 120 days, courts will no longer be forced to adopt such a strained interpretation
of the Rule's literal language. 8A J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 35.02[2], at 35-6
n.10.1 (2d ed. 1975). I disagree with Professor Moore. I cannot foresee how the court would
be able to reach an informed and intelligent decision within the technical time limitation of
Rule 35 when, for example, defendant's motion was filed close to the expiration of that
time period, if the court is to consider those factors which I suggest should be taken into
account in deciding whether to reduce a sentence.33 In Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139 (1964), the Supreme Court held that it
was error to dismiss a motion for new trial received by the District Court four days be-
yond the ten day time limitation of Rule 37(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure when petitioner had done all he could under the circumstances to file his motion
in a timely fashion. The Court emphasized:
Overlooked, in our view, was the fact that the Rules are not, and were not
intended to be, a rigid code to have an inflexible meaning irrespective of the
circumstances. Rule 2 begins with the admonition that 'Etjhese rules are intended
to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be
construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
[A]s long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the
timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give
him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the
appropriateness of the sentence.84
Of course, when the sentencing judge acts sua sponte, as I am advocat-
ing here, he should be required to stay strictly within the time require-
ments set forth in the Rule, whether the present 120 days or the 180
days I propose.
My suggestion that the time limitation of Rule 35 be increased to
180 days is motivated both by substantive and administrative consid-
erations.35 I realize that some restriction on the court's authority to
act is necessary, and that at some point the trial court must relinquish
its central role in the corrections process and defer to the presumably
greater competence of penal authorities. 6 Nevertheless, I believe that
after four months the pattern of conduct the defendant has established
following his sentencing is only beginning to emerge, and that an addi-
tional two months would enable the court to reach a more considered
and informed decision on whether to modify the original sentence. Any
cutoff date is, of course, necessarily arbitrary, and mistakes in judg-
ment will be made no matter how long the period in which the sen-
tencing judge may act. However, my own experience has convinced
me that amendment of Rule 35 to permit reduction of the sentence
within 180 days of the date of sentencing would, on balance, significantly
increase the benefits that flow from a practice of automatic sentence re-
view by the trial judge.
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.' That the Rules were not approached
with sympathy for their purpose is apparent when the circumstances of this case
are examined.
Id. at 142. See also Dodge v. Bennett, 335 F.2d 657, 658 (1st Cir. 1964) (district court bad
jurisdiction to consider motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 received by the court
more than 60 days after the date of sentencing when defendant's letter was timely mailed
at the institution where he was confined but was inexplicably delayed by the penitentiary
authorities).
34 United States v. United States District Court, Cent. Dist. of Cal., 509 F.2d 1352,
1356 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
35 Extension of the time limit to 180 days would bring Rule 35 into conformity with
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970), which provides that the trial court
when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well
as the defendant will be served thereby, may impose a sentence in excess of six
months and provide that the defendant be confined in a jail-type institution or a
treatment institution for a period not exceeding six months and that the execution
of the remainder of the sentence be suspended and the defendant placed on proba-
tion for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.
36 "[T]he period [for reduction of sentencel should not be so long as to conflict with
institutional programs. Additional material discovered later can be used by parole boards."
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Model Sentencing Act-2d Edition, Comment
on Section 11, Modification of Sentence, in 18 CRYMM AND DELINQUENCY 335, 364 (1972).
Cf. United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Smith,
[Vol. 51:355
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From an administrative point of view, my suggestion to broaden
the time limitation of Rule 35 is best understood with reference to the
second amendment I propose to that Rule. Where the judge has im-
posed a sentence of incarceration, I believe that he should receive in
every case, no later than 20 days before the date on which his authority
to modify the original sentence terminates, a written report from the
institution describing and evaluating the conduct of the defendant at
that institution. Retaining the present 120-day time limitation upon
the judge's jurisdiction to modify sentence sua sponte would thus im-
pose a heavy burden upon penal authorities, who cannot realistically be
expected to prepare and submit the contemplated report within 100 days.
Judge James M. Bums of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Oregon has emphasized this precise problem:
I know from my own experience (and from the experience of other
District Judges) that even when the motion is filed within 120 days,
often a considerable amount of time elapses before the Judge can act.
Many District Judges do as I myself when a Rule 35 motion is re-
ceived: I ask the Bureau of Prisons for a report on the status, con-
ditions and progress of the Defendant in the institution in which he
is confined. It usually takes at least 60 or 90 days for a significant
report to be prepared by the Bureau of Prisons.' From time to time,
the report itself suggests the necessity for exploration and further
study of particular aspects of the case. In such an event, a request
to the Bureau of Prisons may well result in a further delay of one
or two months.87
Some have expressed strong objections to the procedure I pro-
pose,38 and there are obvious limitations to any such report. 39 Never-
theless, I reiterate my personal conviction that the sentencing judge is
entitled to receive, indeed is under a duty to consider, all relevant in-
formation both at the time of sentencing and at the time of review of
the sentence imposed. I believe that requiring a written report from
the institution would greatly assist the sentencing judge and would
331 U.S. 469, 476 (1947) cited in 8A J. MooiRE, MooR.'s FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 35.02[1], 35m-4
n.5 (2d ed. 1975).
3 7 United States v. United States District Court, Cent. Dist. of Cal., 509 F.2d 1352,
1357 (9th Cir. 1975) (Bums, J., dissenting).38 If every prisoner who alleged good behavior were entitled to have a warden
prepare and submit a report to the court, the burden on the warden would be
overwhelming and the court would be taking on the function of a parole board.
Surely 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a) (2), under which Maynard was sentenced, reflects the
sound policy that good behavior by a prisoner is chiefly for the Board of Parole
to consider, not the judge.
United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973).
2 9 See note 16 supra.
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neither unreasonably burden penal authorities nor encroach excessively
upon their competence.
A practice of automatic review of all criminal dispositions by the
sentencing judge, as I have recommended here, is obviously no panacea
for the many deficiencies that plague the sentencing process. We live
in a time of great anxiety and confusion about what should be the goals
of our criminal justice system and how those goals can best be achieved;
it is a time of desperate need for direction, clarification, and improve-
ment. My own suggestions are admittedly undramatic, modest in scope
and purpose. Nevertheless, I deeply believe that they would contribute
to the fair and just determination of criminal judgments, and I urge
their adoption.
